In several works, Holmes Rolston III has argued that a satisfactory environmental ethic cannot be built on a virtue ethical foundation. His first argument amounts to the charge that because virtue ethics is by nature 'self-centred' or egoistic it is also inherently 'human-centred' and hence ill suited to treating environmental matters. According to his second argument, virtue ethics is perniciously human-centred since it 'locates' the value of a thing, not in the thing itself, but in the agent who is 'ennobled' by valuing it. I argue that these charges, though illuminating, are not in the final analysis compelling. The first, I suggest, misconceives the role of motivation in virtue ethics, while the second ultimately rests on a misunderstanding of the place of the human perspective in ethical considerations.
1.
Neat and crisp definitions of 'virtue ethics' are hard to provide, but one suggestion, as good as any, is that it is that ethical approach for which judgements of character are primary.
1 While other kinds of ethicist emphasise other matters -maximising utility, say, or the securing of moral rights -the virtue ethicist is primarily concerned with the character of the agent, with her virtues and vices and, more generally, with the shape of her life as a whole.
At first sight, this emphasis on human character might seem very 'anthropocentric' and quite at odds with a proper moral concern for the nonhuman world. Yet in recent years there has been a good deal of interest in the possibility of applying virtue ethics to environmental issues.
Writers such as Philip Cafaro, Louke van Wensveen and Geoffrey Frasz have shown how
reflecting on human character can shed light on our moral relations with the nonhuman world.
2 Not all writers are so optimistic, however. Robert Elliot, for instance, has concluded that the 'prospect of a virtue-based environmental ethic seem dim'. 3 Moreover, in various works, Holmes Rolston III has raised several incisive objections to the very idea of an environmental virtue ethic. 4 My aim, in this paper, is to rebut Rolston's criticisms, and thereby to show, more generally, that virtue ethics is not 'human-centred' in any sense that ought to perturb environmental thinkers.
2.
In making his case, Rolston runs together several distinct arguments, which we will need to tease apart. His first is indicated by claims such as the following:
The other cannot be seen simply as a source of personal transformation.
5
It is virtuous to recognize the rights of other persons, but the motivating force is their rights that I appreciate, not my self-respect. 6 Both these claims are couched as responses to the virtue ethicist: they both amount to the contention that, pace the virtue ethicist, concern for others cannot be grounded in self-interest. At first sight, then, Rolston would seem to be resurrecting the old charge that virtue ethical theories are by nature self-centred or egoistic. 7 In order to see why anyone might think this charge compelling, it may be helpful to consider some more general features of virtue ethics. As good a place as any to start in this is with 'eudaimonism', the thesis that a virtue may be defined as a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well. 8 Virtue ethicists have traditionally subscribed to some kind of eudaimonism. 9 Thus for Aristotle, to say that justice and courage are virtues is to say that the unjust or cowardly man cannot have lived well, that he must have fallen short of achieving well-being. This emphasis on the importance of promoting well-being has led some writers to worry that in acting virtuously the virtuous agent must be motivated by a self-centred or egoistic concern to promote his or her own well-being.
I assume this is the view Rolston means to express in the quotations above. However, Rolston is an environmental ethicist and he believes that the charge of egoism militates, not just against virtue ethics generally, but more particularly against the notion that a virtue ethical theory can provide an adequate account of our moral relations with the natural world. In this he would seem, at first glance at least, to be correct: if virtue ethical theories are thought to be inherently egoistic or self-centred then, since the self in question is de facto a human self, they will also be human-centred (in a sense to be explained presently); and if they are human-centred then they are supposed to be ill suited to dealing with environmental issues. 10 A view of this kind is implied in the following passage:
The preservation of [a particular kind of desert fish] is not covertly the cultivation of human excellences; the lives of these fish in the desert is the overt value defended… It seems unexcellent -cheap and philistine -to say that excellence of character is what we are after when we preserve these endangered species.
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The 'what we are after' implies that, in Rolston's view, the virtue ethicist subscribes to the notion that what motivates people to protect rare desert fish is the desire to better themselves, a desire that is both self-centred (the conservationist wants to better herself) and human-centred (because the self in question is human). This human-centredness, moreover, is thought to be a bad thing since it involves treating some part of the natural world (in this case, the fish) as valuable only to the extent that it serves human interests.
3.
One can respond to these arguments in various ways; in this paper, however, I will try to show, pace Rolston, that virtue ethical theories are not by nature egoistic or self-centred, for if they are not self-centred then one will not be justified, on these grounds at least, in accusing them of human-centredness.
So is virtue ethics inherently egoistic? Well, it is certainly the case that, according to some virtue ethical theories, a desire to be regarded as virtuous will motivate one to act virtuously. This lies at the heart of Aristotle's virtue of magnanimity, for instance, the virtue expressed in extravagant displays of wealth and generosity.
I am myself sympathetic to the view that most of us are, more often than we are prepared to admit, motivated to act well for selfish reasons. But there is no reason why a concern to be well thought of must, of necessity, be accorded a central role in one's economy of virtue. Aristotle's is not the only ideal of human excellence, and other accounts of the ends of human life see little or no virtue in a desire to be well regarded. 12 For these reasons one would not be justified, on these grounds, in concluding that virtue ethical theories are inherently egoistic or self-centred.
Yet the charge of egoism can be rephrased. Perhaps, one might argue, virtue ethics is self-centred because of its assumption that the virtuous agent must be motivated to act well by a desire to become an exemplary individual. Consider the heroic ideal, for example. It seems reasonable to suppose that men such as Achilles and Beowulf act proudly, impetuously and bravely precisely because they want to become proud, impetuous and brave, and that they want to develop these qualities, not only because they want to be regarded as excellent individuals, but because they themselves want to become excellent individuals.
The first thing to note here is that there is no reason why a virtue ethic must endorse the claim that a virtuous person is motivated by a desire to become an exemplary individual, and so one would not be justified in accusing all virtue ethical theories of being egoistic or self-centred on these grounds. 13 Moreover, I am not convinced that, even when one considers those theories that advocate heroic ideals, the heroic figures in question may justly be condemned as selfabsorbed, and so I am not convinced that virtue ethical theories according to which such heroic ideals are vaunted must be dismissed as self-centred. It simply isn't clear to me that someone who acts well out of a desire to become a noble or outstanding character ought necessarily to be condemned. At the very least, his self-centredness -if such it is -ought to be distinguished from the self-centredness of the merely selfish individual, and not simply because he probably has a more developed notion of what his self-interest consists in.
14 So it is questionable whether it would be right, on these grounds at least, to dismiss virtue ethical theories as egoistic or self-centred. But the charge of self-centredness fails for other reasons too. For by the lights of any plausible virtue ethical theory, a virtuous agent will be motivated, not only (if at all) by a desire to better themselves, but also by other concerns.
Consider other-regarding virtues (dispositions to help others for their own sakes). Within the context of a eudaimonist virtue ethic, other-regarding character traits will count as virtues because they contribute to the well-being of the agent. So if benevolence -or indeed any other-regarding trait -is a virtue, then acting benevolently will typically be good for the benevolent agent. 15 However, to say that acting benevolently might make one a better person is not to say that one acts benevolently in order to become a better person. The benevolent agent does not act solely from a concern to promote her own well-being; indeed, if she did so, she would not be genuinely benevolent. 16 She acts out of benevolence, which is to say that she is motivated to act by her perception of others in need of help.
As we have seen, Rolston occasionally seems to assume, mistakenly, that the virtuous person must be motivated solely by self-interest. However, one suspects that even he doesn't find these claims wholly convincing since, in other passages, he maintains that although it is possible to be virtuous, the person who acts virtuously because acting in that way promotes their own well-being is not genuinely virtuous at all. 'To be truly virtuous', he writes, 'one must respect values in nature for their own sake and not as tributary to human flourishing'. tributary to human flourishing'. As we have seen, Rolston finds the first horn of the dilemma unacceptable (he concludes that it 'hardly seems ethical'). 18 The second horn of the dilemma, however, seems to commit one to an account of environmental concern that rests, not on one's account of the virtues, but on some conception of non-aretaic value, that is, on some account of those values that may be defined without reference to the character of the agent. At first sight, this dilemma might appear to be false. For it might seem that a virtue ethicist who accepts the presence of selfless motivation (and thus escapes the first horn of the dilemma) might nonetheless eschew any commitment to non-aretaic values (and so avoid the second). In order to see how this might be achieved consider the following example.
Imagine a conservationist, Sarah, who, motivated by altruism, perceives our aforementioned desert fish to be valuable in itself. Both Rolston and the virtue ethicist can accept that, far from being anthropocentric, Sarah's efforts to conserve the fish are motivated by her sense that the fish has value in itself. Both can agree that she values the fish for its own sake. 20 Rolston and the virtue ethicist therefore agree on how things seem to Sarah, they agree, in other words, on where value is located (i.e., 'in' the fish). Yet they provide divergent accounts of the source of that value. 21 According to Rolston, Sarah is responding to values that are, not just non-aretaic, but objective, in the sense that they may be defined without reference to humans. 22 By contrast, the virtue ethicist will insist that to say that Sarah values the fish for its own sake is to say that the creature is perceived as having non-instrumental value, value over and above its use-value. But he will add that to say that the fish has non-instrumental value is not necessarily to say that it has this value objectively, independently of the valuing agent; it is only to say that it is valued non-instrumentally. The meaning of this claim is ambiguous, however. On the one hand, it could be taken to mean that an agent will only be motivated to value the 'wild other' if she thinks that doing so will be to her benefit. On the other, it could mean that, according to virtue ethics, the 'wild other' has value if and only if it benefits the agent to value it, regardless of how the agent is motivated. It could mean, in other words, that even if one's motivation for valuing the fish is entirely altruistic, the fish's value remains a function of how such acts of valuing prove ennobling for humans.
If the passage is interpreted in the first way, Rolston's argument fails. But if he is able to demonstrate the truth of the second reading, then he will have shown that a virtue ethical theory must be in a sense human-centred, even if it does not incorporate a self-centred account of motivation.
An argument for the truth of the second reading runs as follows. 25 We saw that the virtue ethicist's account of the value of the fish amounts to the claim that Sarah sees the fish as having a non-instrumental value, and we noted that this claim does not commit her or anyone else to the notion that the fish has objective value. Rolston, then, the virtue ethicist, precisely because he remains committed to anthropogenism, is unable to do justice to the value nature has 'in itself', in the absence of humans.
6.
In responding to this claim, I should first say that it is not clear to me that the virtue ethicist must adopt a theory of value according to which things only have value if it proves virtuous for humans to value them. 30 However, whatever the truth regarding this matter, a virtue ethicist who did subscribe to such a theory would not for that reason be debarred from assigning value to a human-free world. 31 For such a theorist could maintain that to say that something has value is to say that it would be virtuous ('ennobling') to value it. After all, if a disposition to value a certain kind of thing is virtuous, then it is virtuous whether or not any valuers are actually present.
Perhaps only potential valuers are needed. So on this 'dispositional' account, one could say that there would still be values in nature even if humans were wiped from the face of the earth, for even in the absence of humans, it would still be virtuous to value natural things. 32 Rolston does in fact consider this possibility, but he concludes that it still results in a light-in-the-fridge kind of situation. According to a dispositional account of value, he writes, 'actual value is an event in consciousness, though of course natural items while still in the dark [i.e., unperceived by humans] have potential intrinsic value'. 33 This, however, is an odd charge to make against a dispositional theory, since such a theory is meant to provide an account, not of potential value, but of value simpliciter. So, to frame the matter in terms of a virtue-based dispositional account, if the desert fish would be perceived by a virtuous agent to have value then, on that account, it has value, not merely potential value, even in the absence of virtuous agents.
So on the account we are considering, or indeed any other dispositional account, one does not end up with a light-in-the-fridge situation.
Just as I am not convinced that the virtue ethicist has to endorse the theory of value outlined above, so I am not convinced that virtue ethics must be saddled with a dispositional theory of value. 34 Rolston, for his part, would certainly reject any such dispositional theory, not on account of its failing to gel with the central commitments of virtue ethics, but because it is, in his view, inherently at odds with environmental ethics. To be sure, he might concede that such a dispositional account could be nonanthropocentric, in that it need not reckon the value of nonhuman beings by the rule of human desire, but he would, once again, emphasise that in defining value with reference to human beings any such account must remain anthropogenic. The source of value is still in human beings, rather than the world. And that simply isn't good enough. But how exactly is one to understand this demand? It is not, I think, simply a call for us to conceive of a world with no humans in it. This, after all, is something we are easily capable of.
What Rolston wants, what he thinks is
Indeed, we can conceive of such a world as being populated with all kinds of valuable things, and we are able to do this because we picture ourselves not, to be sure, in the world, but not entirely removed from it either. Instead, we imagine ourselves, so to speak, looking down on the world, as if from God's perspective, and valuing the things we see. But as Berkeley noted, to picture things in this way is still to rely on the presence of at least one valuer, namely oneself, and so such thoughts may readily be accommodated within a dispositional account of value such as the one presented above. good-of-its-kind; it defends its own kind as a good kind'. 35 It seems natural to speak in these ways, and in doing so Rolston claims that we are speaking about values.
These claims raise all kinds of interesting philosophical questions -but I will not discuss them here. For one thing, Rolston has, throughout his distinguished career, already covered that terrain, and better than I could manage. For another, I wish to consider a different issue: not whether such values exist, but how, if at all, their existence or non-existence might bear upon our central concern with the possibility of an environmental virtue ethics.
7.
Rolston's general claim, recall, is that the kinds of values one discovers in nature are nonanthropogenic, which is to say that they may be defined without reference to human beings. Now an environmental virtue ethic that bases our moral regard for nature on the presence of such non- 36 The stumbling block for Rolston's argument is that it isn't clear how such values, if they remain entirely removed from human concerns, could bear upon ethics, and so it isn't clear why any ethic that fails to take account of them should be regarded as incomplete.
Consider a tree. Rolston may be right to say that in describing the life of the tree we must describe, not just facts, but values as well. The tree needs certain things (sunlight, etc.), and it is benefited when these are available; it can be harmed; it can flourish or decline -and so forth.
Nonetheless, these things granted, it remains an open question how those values -if they may be so described -bear upon our lives. It remains to be shown, in other words, whether those natural values supposedly discovered in the tree should be valued by us. As Hargrove writes:
the fact that a particular creature has a good of its own is not enough automatically to produce moral behavior on behalf of the creature. After discovering that something has a good of its own, the human or humans must decide to intrinsically value it… 37 Now once one considers the question of how those natural values (the organism's good, or whatever) bear upon what we as humans value, then one is back in anthropogenic territory. And this is territory on which virtue ethicists can have much to say: about the role appreciating the goods of other creatures might play in the living of a fulfilling life; about how the exemplary individual would respond to such values; about the character traits brought into play in responding appropriately to them -and so on.
So humans may respond to the natural values Rolston identifies -it may even be virtuous for them to do so. But when they respond to these values they are only doing so because they bear upon their lives, because, so to speak, they disclose themselves as valuable. The life of the tree may indeed be infused by value. But if that value remains completely independent of our lives, if it remains what Keewok Lee has called 'mutely enacted' value, it will mean nothing to us. 38 The notion of non-anthropogenic value is, to ethics, nothing more an idle wheel.
In the first sections of this paper, I argued that although the 'entry point for ethical reflection' for virtue ethics is the agent's reflection on her life as a whole, that self-centredness, if it may be so described, is merely formal, entailing no substantive conclusions about the place of other-regarding concerns in the good life. 39 My response here has a similar form. Virtue ethics is indeed anthropogenic -it cannot take account of 'mutely enacted' value. That, however, is no failing. For it is not clear what role non-anthropogenic 'values' could play in an ethic, and so it is not clear why any ethic that fails to take account of them ought, for that reason, to be criticised.
Virtue ethics is indeed human-centred in this sense; however, since it is not clear how an ethic could be anything else, that human-centredness is, once again, merely formal, entailing no substantive conclusions regarding our relations to the nonhuman world. Just as virtue ethics need not be egoistic, so it need not be human-centred in any sense that ought to perturb environmental thinkers.
8.
According to the subtitle of Rolston's recent paper on the topic, environmental virtue ethics is 'Half the Truth but Dangerous as a Whole'. It is true that valuing the natural world tends to make us better people. But it would, he contends, be dangerous for us to focus exclusively on our selfdevelopment and so to forget those values that exist beyond the compass of our human-centred concerns.
I have argued that, given a realistic conception of what self-development involves, one that acknowledges the key role of other-regarding concerns in the good life, this danger is illusory. But it remains to be shown whether virtue ethics could be anything more than half the truth, whether, in other words, a satisfactory environmental ethic could be built solely from aretaic components. To be sure, I have rejected Rolston's demand that a satisfactory environmental ethic must incorporate some account of non-anthropogenic value. But it is unclear to me whether such an ethic would have to incorporate some conception of non-aretaic (yet still anthropogenic) value.
Perhaps we will find that a satisfactory environmental ethic will have to incorporate nonaretaic components. Perhaps, in other words, we will find that virtue ethics does not provide the whole truth in this sense, at least in the sphere of environmental ethics. However, even if this were to prove the case, one would not be justified, on these grounds, in concluding that the project of 'environmental virtue ethics' had reached the end of its road. This conclusion would only be justified if there were good reasons to think that the ideal of a single, comprehensive environmental ethic, whether based on aretaic concepts or not, is an ideal environmental ethicists should strive for. If moral pluralism is the best option, then virtue ethicists ought not to be condemned on account of their inability to deliver the whole truth. 40 They ought to be praised for having delivered half. 
